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GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL, DO NOT PASS
GO, DO NOT KEEP HOUSE
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996)
I. INTRODUCrION
In United States v. Ursery,' the Supreme Court reviewed two cases
from the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. Both appellate
courts held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 2
prohibited the Government from both criminally punishing a defend-
ant and forfeiting the defendant's property for the same offense in
parallel, but separate, proceedings.3 With one Justice dissenting,4 the
Court reversed both decisions, holding that civil forfeitures generally,
and the forfeitures at issue in particular, do not constitute "punish-
ment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is to protect against multiple punishments by prohib-
iting the Government from punishing, or attempting to punish, twice
for the same offense. 6 While the Sixth and Ninth Circuits held that
the civil forfeitures in the cases before them constituted "punishment"
subject to double jeopardy prohibition, the Government challenged
that characterization of the forfeitures. 7 This Note argues that the
Court's ruling and agreement with the Government was not only a
surprising result given the direction in which the Court has headed in
recent years, but a regrettable one as well. While not a reversal of
precedent, the Court abandoned the common sense path it had
forged in three of its recent cases. The Court reverted to an old test
for determination of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to
civil forfeitures, and arguably reached the wrong result when applying
that test. This Note concludes that the Court mistakenly passed on
the opportunity to fashion a more just and meaningful test for deter-
1 116 S. CL 2135, 2138 (1996).
2 U.S. Const. amend. V.
S See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (1995); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (1994).
4 Urseiy, 116 S. C. at 2152.
5 Id at 2138.
6 Witte v. United States, 115 S. C. 2199, 2204 (1995).
7 Urseqy, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
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mining when the Double Jeopardy Clause should prohibit civil
forfeitures.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that "nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."8 As the Supreme
Court has stated, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three
abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multi-
ple punishments for the same offense.9
The Federal Government has long been able to expropriate per-
sonal property used in the commission of crimes.' 0 In today's world,
civil forfeiture statutes provide law enforcement with a powerful tool
against criminal activity," and have been strongly employed in the
war on drug use and dealing. For most of the Supreme Court's his-
tory, the Double Jeopardy Clause applied only to "criminal" punish-
ments.' 2 In recent years, however, beginning with United States v.
Halper,13 the Court has shown a willingness to look beyond the "civil"
label of a sanction to the underlying intent, thus throwing into uncer-
tainty the traditional understanding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply to civil forfeitures.
A. PRE-HALPER
One of the early cases in which the Supreme Court considered
the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of forfeiture of property
was in In re Various Items of Personal Property.'4 In Various Items, the
United States sought to forfeit the distillery, warehouse, and denatur-
ing plant of a distilling corporation on the ground that the corpora-
tion violated § 600(a) of the Revenue Act of 191815 by defrauding the
government of taxes imposed on the spirits distilled on the prem-
8 U.S. Const. amend. V.
9 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
10 See, e.g., Act ofJuly 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47 (1850).
11 See Dep't. of'Justice Alert 2 (Oct. 3, 1994).
12 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984).
'3 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
14 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
15 The statute provided:
On and after February 26, 1926, on all distilled spirits which are diverted to bever-
age purposes or for use in the manufacture or production of any article used or in-
tended for use as a beverage there shall be levied and collected a tax of $6.40 on each
proof gallon or wine gallon when below proof, and a proportionate tax at a like rate
on all fractional parts of such proof or wine gallon, to be paid by the person responsi-
ble for such diversion.
26 U.S.C. § 245(4) (1930).
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ises.' 6 The Court addressed the issue of whether a criminal conviction
of a conspiracy to violate § 600(a) barred the forfeiture proceeding.
17
According to the Court, where the right of forfeiture is in rem and
created by statute, it is the property that is primarily considered the
offender, or, in other words, the offense attaches to the property.1s By
resort to a legal fiction, the proceeding is against the property, which
is held guilty and condemned. 19 By contrast, in a criminal prosecu-
tion the proceeding is against the wrongdoer in personam.2 0 The
Court thus distinguished a proceeding in rem to forfeit property used
to commit an offense from a civil action to recover taxes.21 Because
the latter is in fact a penalty and punitive in character, it is barred by a
prior conviction of a defendant for a criminal offense involving the
same transactions.22 The Court held the forfeiture proceedings
before it to be in rem, and thus not part of the punishment for the
criminal offense.23 Accordingly, the Court found inapplicable the
double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment.24
The Court did not address the double jeopardy implications of in
rem civil forfeitures again for over forty years until One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States.25 In Emerald Cut Stones, the defendant entered
the country without declaring to United States Customs contraband of
one "lot" of emerald cut stones and one ring.26 After acquittal on a
criminal smuggling charge,27 the United States government brought
an action under both 18 U.S.C. § 545 and 19 U.S.C. § 149728 seeking
16 Various Items, 282 U.S. at 578.
17 Id at 579.
18 Id. at 580.
19 Id. at 581.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 580 (distinguishing United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931)).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 581.
24 Id.
25 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
26 Id.
27 The criminal charge was brought under 18 U.S.C. § 545, which provided:
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States, smug-
gles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any merchandise which should
have been invoiced... [sihall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both ....
Merchandise introduced into the United States in violation of this section, or the
value thereof, to be recovered from any person described in the first or second para-
graph of this section, shall be forfeited to the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970).
28 The civil statute provided:
Any article not included in the declaration and entry as made, and, before examina-
tion of the baggage was begun, not mentioned in writing by such person, if written
declaration and entry was required, or orally if written declaration and entry was not
1997]
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forfeiture of the contraband.29 Addressing the double jeopardy issue,
the Court held that the DoubleJeopardy Clause did not bar the forfei-
ture because it constituted neither a second criminal trial nor a sec-
ond criminal punishment.30 Quoting from Helvering v. Mitchell 3 1 the
Court stated that "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil
sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeop-
ardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second
time to punish criminally, for the same offense."32 According to the
Court, the question of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is
one of statutory construction.3 3 The Court characterized forfeitures
under § 1497 as remedial rather than punitive sanctions, for they pre-
vented forbidden merchandise from circulating in the country and
provided a reasonable form of reimbursing the Government for inves-
tigation and enforcement expenses.3 4 Thus, the Court determined
that forfeiture of the emeralds was a civil sanction and not so unrea-
sonable or excessive as to transform its clear civil intent into a criminal
penalty.3 5 Given the civil and remedial nature of the forfeiture, the
Court declared that it was not barred by the criminal acquittal.
3 6
A little more than a decade after Emerald Cut Stones, the Court
decided United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms.37 The issue in 89
Firearms was whether a gun owner's acquittal on criminal firearms
charges precluded a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against
those firearms.38 Following acquittal for dealing in firearms without a
license, the defendant in 89 Firearms faced forfeiture, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 924(d), 39 of the seized firearms.40 As an initial matter, the
Court stated that under Mitchell, at the very least, an acquittal of a
criminal charge did not automatically bar forfeiture of goods involved
required, shall be subject to forfeiture and such person shall be liable to a penalty
equal to the value of such article.
19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1970).
29 Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 233.
30 Id at 235.
3' 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
32 Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 235.




37 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
38 Id. at 355.
39 The statute provided in part:
Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used or intended to be used in, any viola-
tion of the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation promulgated thereun-
der, or any violation of any other criminal law of the United States, shall be subject to
seizure and forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1982).
40 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 356.
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in the alleged criminal activity, or other civil penalties.4 ' Turning to
the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court stated that
unless Congress intended the forfeiture statute as punishment, or by
its nature the statute necessarily was punitive, so that the proceeding
was essentially criminal in character, the prohibition did not apply.42
The Court reiterated that a civil or criminal determination begins
as a matter of statutory interpretation.48 Citing United States v. Ward,44
the Court noted that this determination has two levels.45 The first
level involves an inquiry into whether Congress indicated either ex-
pressly or impliedly a preference for a criminal or a civil label in estab-
lishing the statutory penalty.46  If the intent was for a criminal
sanction, the inquiry need go no further, because a second prosecu-
tion would clearly violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.47 Where Con-
gress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, however,
the second level asks whether the statutory scheme is so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
48
After a determination that Congress designed § 924(d) as a reme-
dial civil sanction, the 89 Firearms Court turned to the second prong
of the Ward test 49 In so doing, the Court examined a list of considera-
tions established in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez0 to aid in determin-
ing whether the statute's purpose or effect negated § 924(d)'s civil
intent.5' The Court found that only one factor-the fact that the pro-
scribed behavior was already a crime-lent any support to the view
that the statute imposed a criminal penalty.5 2 This slight overlap of
criminal and civil characteristics, however, failed to persuade the
Court that a clearly designed civil remedy had been transformed into
41 lR. at 361.
42 Id- at 362.
43 Id
44 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
45 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362.
46 Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236-37
(1972)).
47 Id.
48 IR at 362-63.
49 1& at 363-65.
50 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) ("Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned are all relevant to the inquiry.").




a criminal penalty.53 The Court thus concluded that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause did not bar the non-criminal forfeiture.
54
B. HALPER AND BEYOND
Beginning with United States v. Halper,55 the Court decided a trio
of cases that indicated a shift in its application of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. In Halper, the Court considered whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a civil penalty might constitute punishment for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis. 56 Halper, as a manager of a medical ser-
vice provider, submitted sixty-five false claims for Medicare reimburse-
ment that cost the Government a total of $585. 57 When the
Government became aware of Halper's scheme, it tried and convicted
him on sixty-five counts of violating a false-claims statute58 and sixteen
counts of mail fraud.59 After conviction, the Government brought a
claim under the civil False Claims Act,60 for which Halper was liable
for $2,000 per false claim, a civil penalty totaling $130,000.61
According to the Halper Court, a recovery of civil penalties under
the False Claims Act does not rise to the level of punishment simply
because the recovery exceeds the Government's actual damages.62 In
the Court's view, however, this did not preclude the possibility that in
any particular case, a civil penalty under the Act "may be so extreme
and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to
constitute punishment," for no precedent established an absolute rule
that a civil fine could not be "punishment" under the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. 63 According to the Court, one can identify a violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause only by assessing the purposes actually
served by the sanction in question, not the underlying criminal or civil
nature of the proceeding.64 The Court stated that the labels "crimi-
nal" and "civil" were not of paramount importance, for the Court un-
derstood punishment to cut across both civil and criminal law.65 Any
53 Id. at 366.
54 Id.
55 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
56 Id. at 436.
57 Id at 437.
58 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1988).
59 Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
60 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1988) (providing for violation when "[a] person not a member of
an armed force of the United States... (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved.").
61 Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
62 Id. at 442.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 447 n.7.
65 Id. at 447.
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sanction, civil or criminal, constitutes punishment when the sanction
serves the punitive goals of either retribution or deterrence as applied
in an individual case.66 As the Court put it, "a civil sanction that can-
not fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent pur-
poses, is punishment."67 While the Court acknowledged that this type
of inquiry will necessarily be inexact, the Court thought it necessary
for those cases where the Government seeks to impose on an already
criminally convicted defendant a civil penalty that bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating it for its loss. 68 The Court thus
remanded the case for an accounting of the Government's damages
and costs to determine whether the penalty sought was so unrelated to
the goal of making the Government whole as to constitute
punishment.
69
Four years after Halper, the Court decided Austin v. United States.
70
In Austin, the Court faced the question of whether the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4)
and (a) (7) 71 forfeitures of property.7 2 After the indictment and con-
viction of petitioner Austin on one count of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute, the United States filed an in rem action seeking
forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and auto body shop pursuant to
the statutes.73 Austin claimed that the forfeiture would violate the Ex-
66 Id. at 448.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 449.
69 Id. at 451-52.
70 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
71 The statute provided:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them: ...
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1),
(2), or (9), except that- ...
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blind-
ness of the owner....
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-
ments, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or
to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowl-
edge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a) (4), (7) (1992).
72 Autin, 509 U.S. at 604.
73 Id at 604-05.
1997] 725
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cessive Fines Clause. 74 The Austin Court determined that since the
purpose of the clause was to limit the government's power to punish,
the question was whether forfeiture was punishment, not, as the
United States argued, whether forfeiture was civil or criminal. 75 In
considering the question of punishment, the Court stated that sanc-
tions often serve more than one purpose, and if the forfeiture serves
in part to punish, it is subject to the constraints of the Excessive Fines
Clause.
76
The Court thus turned to consider, first, whether forfeitures in
general have historically been understood to punish, at least in part,
and second, whether forfeitures under § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) should
be so understood in 1993.77 The Court first noted it had consistently
recognized that statutory forfeitures in particular, and forfeitures in
general, serve at least in part to punish the property owner.78 In addi-
tion, the Court found nothing in the provisions of § 881 (a) (4) and
(a) (7) to contradict this historical understanding of forfeiture as pun-
ishment.79 In fact, the Court stated, the express "innocent owner" de-
fenses of the statutes reveal a congressional intent to punish only
those involved in drug trafficking by focusing on the culpability of the
owner.80 Moreover, the Court found that the statute's legislative his-
tory confirmed its punitive nature.81 According to the Court, then,
even assuming that the statutory provisions serve some remedial pur-
pose, one could not consider them to serve solely a remedial pur-
pose.82 As such, the forfeitures are a form of punishment, and
therefore subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause.
83
In a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the forfeiture of
Austin's property constituted punishment.84 In Justice Scalia's opin-
ion, one must consider the taking of lawful property, in whole or in
part, punitive, for its purpose is not compensatory.8 5 "Punishment is
being imposed, whether one quaintly considers its object to be the
property itself, or more realistically regards its object to be the prop-
74 Id at 605.
75 Id. at 609-10.
76 Md at 610.
77 Id. at 610-11.
78 Id at 618.
79 Id at 619.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 620.
82 Id. at 621.
83 Id. at 622.
84 Id at 623 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
85 Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
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erty's owner."8 6 In contrast to what he believed was the Court's posi-
tion, however, Scalia stated that the affected property owner need not
be culpable to establish that a forfeiture provision is punitive, for the
Court had never before held that the Constitution required any de-
gree of culpability to support in rem forfeitures.8 7 Regardless of the
need for culpability, though, Justice Scalia stated that the forfeiture in
the case at hand, and forfeitures generally under § 881 (a), were cer-
tainly a form of punishment for an offense.""
Most recently, the Court decided Department of Revenue of Montana
v. Kurth Ranch. 9 The issue for the Court in Kurth Ranch was whether
a Montana tax on the possession of illegal drugs90 assessed after the
State had imposed a criminal penalty for the same possession violated
the prohibitions of the Double Jeopardy Clause.91 While the Court
rejected a Halpermode of analysis, it stated that the question before it
was whether the tax had punitive characteristics that subjected it to
the constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause.92 While the Court
noted that taxes typically differ from fines, penalties, and forfeitures
in that they are usually motivated by revenue-raising rather than puni-
tive purposes, it also found that at some point a tax must be consid-
ered punishment.93 In the Court's opinion, the high rate associated
with Montana's tax and the obvious deterrent purpose, while not dis-
positive, were consistent with a punitive character.9 4 When viewed in
connection with other features of the tax, such as the fact that the tax
was conditioned on the commission of a crime, the Court concluded
that the tax differed in too many significant respects from a typical tax
to escape characterization as punishment.95 As such, the tax was not
the kind of remedial sanction that could permissibly follow criminal
punishment.96
In the first of three dissenting opinions in the case, ChiefJustice
86 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
87 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement). Justice Ken-
nedy,joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, also writing separately, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, agreed with Justice Scalia that not all in rem forfeitures
are on account of the owner's blameworthy conduct. But Justice Kennedy stated that,
unlike Scalia, he reserved the question of whether in rem forfeitures always amount to an
intended punishment of the owner of forfeited property. Id. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgement).
88 Id at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
89 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
90 Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1987).
91 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941.
92 Ia at 1945.
9 Id. at 1946.
94 Id.
95 Id at 1947-48.
96 Id. at 1948.
19971
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Rehnquist stated that the Court asked the right question, but reached
the wrong answer.97 While Rehnquist agreed that an assessment
which is labeled a "tax" could conceivably constitute "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes, those circumstances did not exist in the
Montana tax. 9s In Rehnquist's view, the tax had a nonpenal purpose
of raising revenue, as well as a legitimate purpose in deterring con-
duct.99 As such, it was a genuine tax not prohibited by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 100
Justice O'Connor dissented with the view that the Montana tax
should be subjected to the Halpertest.1 1 According to O'Connor, the
Court did not know whether this case failed Halper's first prong, since
the Kurths never had to show that the amount of the tax was not ra-
tionally related to the government's legitimate nonpunitive objec-
tives. 102 In O'Connor's view, the Court's declaration that the
Montana tax is always punitive was an unwarranted expansion of its
doublejeopardyjurisprudence, and the Court should have remanded
with instructions to follow a Halper analysis.' 03
In a final dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated his personal be-
lief that the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause clearly prohibits only
multiple prosecutions, not multiple punishments. 104 According to
Scalia, "to be put in jeopardy" does not remotely mean "to be pun-
ished."105 Until Halper, the multiple-punishments component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause was limited to successive prosecutions-
Halper gave the no-double-punishments rule a breadth never before
enjoyed. 10 6 In Scalia's view, a civil proceeding successive to a criminal
prosecution is not barred even if it has the potential to result in the
imposition of a penalty.10 7 According to Scalia, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment keeps punishment within the bounds
established by the legislature, and the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
97 Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
98 Id. at 1951 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
99 Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
100 1& (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Reviewing the holding of Halper, Justice
O'Connor stated that a defendant must first show the absence of a rational relationship
between the amount of a sanction and the government's nonpunitive objectives. If the
defendant meets this first prong, then the burden shifts to the government to justify the
sanction with reference to its expenses in the particular case. Id (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
102 Id. at 1955 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
103 Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104 Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 1956-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
728 [Vol. 87
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ments and the Excessive Fines Clauses of the Eighth Amendment
place substantive limits upon what those legislative bounds may be. 08
Since Scalia did not find that the Montana tax constituted a second
criminal prosecution, and since the tax was authorized by the Mon-
tana legislature, due process was not violated and the Constitution re-
quired no more. 0 9
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. RESPONDENT GUY JEROME URSERY
Following a tip from the ex-fiancee of Guy Jerome Ursery's son,
the Michigan State Police executed a search warrant of Mr. Ursery's
property and residence on July 30, 1992.110 During a search of the
premises, police officers discovered 142 marijuana plants growing any-
where from 25 to 150 feet outside the Ursery property line."' Inside
Ursery's home, the police found marijuana seeds, stems, and stalks,
two loaded firearms, and a growlight.112 Mr. Ursery and his family
had been growing the marijuana for at least three years, 113 but there
was no evidence that the marijuana was for anything but the family's
personal consumption.114
On September 30, 1992, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7),115
the United States government filed an in rem complaint seeking for-
feiture of Mr. Ursery's residence and surrounding property on the ba-
sis that the property had been used to facilitate the manufacture of
marijuana. 116 Mr. Ursery and his wife filed an answer to the com-
plaint, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan scheduled the forfeiture action for aJuly 1993 trial.117 On
May 17, 1993, however, the Urserys stipulated to a consent judgment
in which they would pay $13,250 to the government in lieu of forfei-
ture of the property.118 The districtjudge entered the judgment pur-
suant to the agreement on May 24, 1993, and the Urserys paid the
108 Id. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1960 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
110 Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (No.
95-345).
111 Brief for Respondent at 3, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (No. 95-
345).
112 Brief for the United States at 3, Ursery (No. 95-345).
113 Id.
114 Brief for Respondent at 5, Urseyy (No. 95-345).
115 See supra note 71.
116 Brief for the United States at 3, Ursey (No. 95-345).
117 Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Ursey (No. 95-345).
118 IM at 4.
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$13,250 on June 17, 1993.119
In the meantime, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Ursery on one
count of manufacturing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) (1)120 on February 5, 1993.121 A trial jury subsequently con-
victed and sentenced him to sixty-three months of imprisonment, but
Ursery filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred his criminal conviction following
the civil forfeiture.122 The district court denied the motion on two
grounds. First, the forfeiture was not an "adjudication" because it was
settled by a consent judgment. 123 Second, the forfeiture action and
criminal conviction were not separate proceedings, but were rather
part of a single, coordinated prosecution. 124
By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
versed. 125 Relying on the Supreme Court opinions of Halperand Aus-
tin, the Sixth Circuit determined that civil forfeitures under
§ 881 (a) (7) were punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 126 Ac-
cording to the Sixth Circuit, the Halper Court established that a civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment under a double jeopardy analy-
sis. 12 7 Applying this test, but in the context of the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Austin Court declared that civil
forfeitures under § 881 (a) (7) were punishment because they did not
serve solely a remedial purpose. 128 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit's view,
under Halper and Austin, any civil forfeiture under § 881 (a) (7) cate-
gorically constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
129
Having found Ursery's civil forfeiture to be punishment, the
court proceeded to determine that both the civil forfeiture and crimi-
nal conviction of Ursery were punishment for the same offense, for
119 1&
120 The criminal statute provided:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1992).
121 Brief for Respondent at 4, Ursery (No. 95-345).
122 Id. at 5.
123 1&
124 Id. at 6.
125 United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
126 Id. at 572-73.
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the forfeiture necessarily required proof of the criminal offense.130
Lastly, the court declared that the facts of the case failed to support a
finding that the civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution constituted a
single proceeding. 131 In short, the Sixth Circuit found punishment
for the same offense in two separate proceedings, and therefore, a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 132 The court reversed Mr.
Ursery's conviction and vacated his sentence.'33
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Milbum disagreed with the court's
conclusion that Ursery's civil forfeiture proceeding and criminal con-
viction were not part of a single, coordinated proceeding. 34 Injudge
Milburn's view, the key factors in a double jeopardy analysis are the
timing of the civil and criminal proceedings and the potential for gov-
ernment abuse of those proceedings. 135 Since the government initi-
ated both the civil and criminal proceedings against Ursery before
determination of either outcome, Judge Milburn concluded that
there was no potential for abuse of process, as the government was not
acting to pursue a second punishment out of dissatisfaction with the
first.136 As such, Judge Milburn found no reason to consider the civil
and criminal actions separate proceedings. 37 In addition, Judge Mil-
bum disagreed with the majority's conclusion that both actions de-
rived from the same offense. 138 In his view, the civil forfeiture action
required a showing that Ursery's property facilitated the manufacture
of marijuana over a period of years, while the criminal indictment
charged Ursery only with manufacturing marijuana in 1992.139 Since
the civil forfeiture action could have been adjudicated without evi-
dence of illegal activities in 1992, Milbum argued that the criminal
prosecution did not derive from the same offense as the forfeiture. 140
Because the civil forfeiture and criminal conviction were part of a sin-
gle, coordinated proceeding on the one hand, and the result of sepa-
rate offenses on the other, no double jeopardy violation occurred.
141
B. RESPONDENT $405,089.23 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY
Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren were charged by a grand
130 Id at 573-74.
131 Id. at 574-75.
132 Id. at 575.
133 Id. at 576.
134 Id. (MilburnJ., dissenting).
135 Id. at 577 (Milburn, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 578 (Milburn, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Milburn, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 579 (Milburn, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Milbum, J., dissenting).
140 Id (Milburn, J., dissenting).
141 I& at 579-80 (Milburn, J., dissenting).
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jury on June 12, 1991, with various counts of conspiracy to aid and
abet the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371, and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956.142 All charges stemmed from a large-scale methamphetamine
manufacturing operation. 143 A jury convicted both on all counts on
March 27, 1992, and each received a sentence of life imprisonment. 44
On June 17, 1991, five days after issuance of the indictment, the
government filed a civil in rem complaint against various properties
held by Arlt, Wren, and Payback Mines, a company controlled by
Arlt.145  Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6)146 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981 (a) (1) (A), 14 7 the government sought forfeiture of United States
currency from various bank accounts and cash, a helicopter, a boat,
an airplane, 138 silver bars, and eleven automobiles.148 The respon-
dents filed claims to the properties, but the parties agreed to defer the
forfeiture proceeding until after criminal prosecutions. 149
After the respondents' convictions, the civil forfeiture case pro-
ceeded. 50 Finding all the items sought by the government subject to
forfeiture as proceeds of illegal narcotics activity, a district courtjudge
granted the government's motion for summary judgment.' 5 ' The
142 United States v. Ursery, 116 S. CL 2135, 2139 (1996).
143 Brief for the United States at 6, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1995) (No.
95-346).
144 Id. at 6-7.
145 Id. at 7.
146 The civil statute provided:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:...
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
nished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to
be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1994).
147 The civil statute provided in part
(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following property is subject to forfei-
ture to the United States:
(A) Any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transac-
tion in violation of... section 1956 or 1957 of this title, or any property traceable to
such property.
18 U.S.C. § 981(a) (1) (A) (1994).






Ninth Circuit, however, reversed.1 52 According to the court, since
both the civil forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution clearly
dealt with the same offense, the only consideration was whether they
constituted separate proceedings and whether civil forfeitures under
§ 881(a) (6) and § 981 (a) (1) (A) constituted "punishment."' 53
Addressing the issue of separate proceedings first, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that a forfeiture action and a criminal prosecution
constitute the same proceeding only if brought in the same indict-
ment and tried at the same time. 154 While the government could have
proceeded in this fashion, it chose otherwise.155 The court stated that
the Supreme Court case of Jeffers v. United States' 56 affirmed its posi-
tion that parallel actions, instituted at about the same time and involv-
ing the same criminal conduct, constitute separate proceedings for
double jeopardy purposes, regardless of whether the government
brings them as a single, coordinated prosecution. 157 WhileJeffers dealt
with parallel criminal actions, 58 the Ninth Circuit saw no difference
when one proceeding was civil and the other criminal;159 a civil forfei-
ture action brought and tried separately from a criminal prosecution
was a separate proceeding.
60
Turning to the question of "punishment," the Ninth Circuit held
that the Supreme Court "changed its collective mind" in Halper as to
whether civil forfeitures constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. 61 As in Ursery's appeal, the court stated that the new test
for determining whether a nominally civil sanction constitutes punish-
ment is whether it cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial pur-
pose. 162 The court interpreted Austin as affirming this change of
heart, emphasizing that a sanction designed even in part to deter or
punish constitutes punishment, regardless of whether it also has a re-
medial purpose. 163 To determine whether a sanction has a solely re-
medial purpose, the court declared that Austin stated the applicable
legal standard, and that a court must look to the entire scope of the
forfeiture statute which the government seeks to employ, rather than
to the characteristics of the specific property the government seeks to
152 Id. at 8.
153 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1994).
154 Id. at 1216-17.
155 Id. at 1217.
156 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
157 $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1218.
160 Id.
161 Id.





According to the court, Austin clarified three relevant principles
in determining whether a forfeiture constitutes punishment: 1) be-
cause of a historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, there
is a strong presumption that any forfeiture statute does not serve
solely a remedial purpose; 2) where a statute focuses on the culpability
of the property owner, it is likely that the enactment serves at least in
part to deter and punish guilty conduct; and 3) where Congress has
tied forfeiture directly to the commission of specified offenses, it is
reasonable to presume that the forfeiture is at least partially intended
as an additional deterrent to, or punishment for, those violations of
law.165 Applying those principles to §§ 881 (a) (6) and 981 (a) (1) (A),
the court concluded that these statutes always operated at least in part
to deter and punish, and thus constituted "punishment."1 66 As such,
the Ninth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
civil forfeiture sought by the government, reversed the district court,
and remanded with instructions to dismiss with prejudice.1 67 A split
court denied the government's petition for rehearing en banc. 168
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 69 in both
cases to determine whether the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against double jeopardy applies to either in rem civil forfeiture action.
The Court consolidated the cases for its review. 170
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.'
7 '
After noting the Court's understanding of the purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause,' 7 2 the Court began its analysis by stating that since
the earliest years of the Nation, Congress has authorized the Govern-
ment to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal pros-
ecutions based upon the same underlying events. 173 The Court, in
turn, has consistently concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply to civil forfeiture actions because civil forfeitures do
164 Id. at 1220.
165 Id. at 1221.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1222.
168 United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995).
169 United States v. Ursery, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1996).
170 United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2138 (1996).
171 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer.
172 See supra text accompanying note 6.
173 Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
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not impose punishment.' 4 To illustrate its point, the Court reviewed
Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms, and reaffirmed that
an in rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction distinct from po-
tentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines. 175
The Court next turned its attention to the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits' contention that the Court both abandoned this view in its three
most recent decisions and adopted a new test for determining when a
nominally civil sanction constitutes "punishment" for doublejeopardy
purposes.'76 According to the Court, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
misread Halper, Austin and Kurth Ranch, for none of those decisions
purported to overrule Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Fire-
arms.177 First, the Court limited Halper to the context of civil penal-
ties, excluding civil forfeitures from the case's reach.'78 In the Court's
view, since the time of Various Items, civil penalties such as fines have
been distinguished from in rem civil forfeiture proceedings because
the fine, like criminal prosecution, is in personam-the proceeding
targets the wrongdoer. 79 In the Court's opinion, a practical applica-
tion of the Halper rule to civil forfeitures would be difficult due to the
virtual impossibility of quantifying the nonpunitive purposes served by
a particular civil forfeiture.' 8 0 As such, the case-by-case test of Halper,
which compares the size of a penalty imposed to the damage suffered
by the Government, cannot apply to a civil forfeiture, for there is no
good way to determine the rational relationship of a particular forfei-
ture to its nonpunitive purpose, and, in any event, civil forfeitures are
not designed merely to compensate the Government.' 18 Thus, the
Court rejected the view that Halper adopted a radically different in-
quiry into whether a civil forfeiture is subject to the Double Jeopardy
Clause, instead emphasizing repeatedly the narrow scope of that deci-
sion.' 82 In addition, according to the majority, the Court expressly
disclaimed reliance upon Halper in Kurth Ranch, finding that its case-
specific approach was impossible to apply outside the context of a
fixed civil-penalty provision.'83 As such, Halper's approach was held
inapplicable to civil forfeitures.' 8 4
174 I
175 I at 2140-42.
176 Id at 2143.
'77 Id
178 Id.
179 Id. at 2144-45.
180 Id- at 2145.
181 I&
182 I& at 2145 n.2.




Second, the Court declared the Austin analysis of the Excessive
Fines Clause to be unrelated to the Double Jeopardy Clause. 185 Ac-
cording to the majority, Austin's approval of Emerald Cut -Stones and 89
Firearms limited its holding to the Excessive Fines Clause.186 After Aus-
tin, forfeitures effected pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7)
are subject to review for excessiveness under the Eighth Amend-
ment.187 This review for excessiveness, however, does not render
those forfeitures so punitive as to constitute punishment for Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy purposes.1
88
In short, according to the majority, nothing in Halper, Austin, or
Kurth Ranch replaced the Court's historical understanding that civil
forfeiture does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy pur-
poses. 189 While Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, Austin with civil forfeitures under the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause, and Kurth Ranch with tax proceedings under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, none dealt with civil forfeitures under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the subject of this case.' 90 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that if the Court had overruled a well-established
rule and long line of precedent, it would have stated as much.' 91
Having dispensed with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' misapplica-
tions of case law, the Court turned to consider the forfeitures at issue
under the two-part test of 89 Firearms. 19 2 Dealing briefly with the first
prong of the test, the Court concluded that Congress intended forfeit-
ures under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 18 U.S.C. § 981 to establish civil, and
not criminal proceedings. 193 According to the Court, the procedural
mechanisms established by Congress for enforcing forfeitures under
the statutes were impersonal and targeted the property itself. 19 4 Thus,
the proceedings were in rem, which have traditionally been viewed as
civil proceedings. 19 5
185 Id.
186 Id. at 2146-47. The Court stated that Austin acknowledged that its categorical ap-
proach under the Excessive Fines Clause was distinct from the case-by-case analysis of
Halper for the Double Jeopardy Clause because of the significant difference between the
purposes of analysis under each constitutional provision. Since the key question under the
Excessive Fines Clause is whether a particular sanction is so large as to be "excessive," there







192 Id. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.





Addressing the second prong of the analysis, the Court found lit-
tle evidence that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (6)
and (a)(7), and 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (A), were so punitive in form
and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent.196 In
the Court's view, the statutes at issue resembled, in most significant
respects, the statutes in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Fire-
arms, which the Court held not to be punitive. 197 While acknowledg-
ing that the statutes may have certain punitive aspects, the Court
noted that they also serve important nonpunitive goals.'98
According to the Court, many considerations support the conclu-
sion that the statutes in question are nonpunitivce civil proceedings. 199
For one, it is "absolutely clear" that courts historically have not re-
garded in rem civil forfeitures as punishment for double jeopardy pur-
poses.200 In addition, the Government need not prove scienter in any
of the statutes under review in order to subject the property to forfei-
ture.201 Finally, though the statutes related to criminal activity, this
fact by itself does not render them punitive.20 2 The Court concluded
by stating that the civil forfeitures in question in these cases were
neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.203 Accordingly, it reversed the appellate courts.20 4
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy wrote separately, in concurrence, to add a few
observations to the majority's holding.205 In Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion, the majority correctly relied on Various Items as the seminal case in
the area of civil forfeitures.2 06 However, the rule of Various Items-that
the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to in personam punishments
of the wrongdoer and not in rem forfeitures-did not imply that for-
feiture inflicts no punishment.2 07 Whether the forfeiture statute af-
196 Id. at 2148.
197 I'&
198 Id.





204 Id. Because the Court concluded that the forfeitures at issue do not constitute "pun-
ishment" for double jeopardy purposes, they declined to address three other arguments
raised by the Government: that the civil forfeitures at issue do not constitute "jeopardy,"
arise out of the same offenses as the applicable criminal prosecutions, and constitute pro-
ceedings separate from the criminal prosecutions. Id at 2140 n.1.
205 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206 Id. at 2150 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
207 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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fects those who carry out a crime or owners who are culpable for the
criminal misuse of their property, any forfeiture still punishes an indi-
vidual by taking property involved in a crime.208 Unlike criminal for-
feitures, however, civil in rem forfeiture actions do not require a
showing that the owner who stands to lose his property has committed
a criminal offense.2 09 According to Justice Kennedy, since the prop-
erty owner may or may not be the wrongdoer charged with a criminal
offense, the civil forfeiture is not a second in personam punishment
for the criminal conduct, and thus is not prohibited by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 21
0
Justice Kennedy asserted that the two-prong test of 89 Firearms
does not add much to the clear rule of Various Items that civil in rem
forfeiture of property involved in a crime is not punishment subject to
the Double Jeopardy Clause.21' In Justice Kennedy's opinion, any in
rem proceeding is civil, and so long as any forfeiture hinges upon the
property's use in a crime, there will always be the remedial purpose of
preventing property owners from allowing their property to be used
for illegal purposes.2 12 Since the Court's application of the test was
consistent with Various Items, however, Justice Kennedy joined the ma-
jority's opinion in full.
21 3
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT
Justice Scalia filed a concurrence in thejudgment only.2 14 In his
brief opinion, Justice Scalia reiterated his view from Kurth Ranch that
the Double Jeopardy Clause merely prohibits successive prosecutions,
not successive punishments.2 15 Because the civil forfeiture proceed-
ings at issue were not criminal prosecutions, double jeopardy did not
bar them.216 Thus, Justice Scalia agreed that the cases did not present
double jeopardy violations.
217
D. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT IN PART AND
DISSENT IN PART
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that Arlt and Wren's for-
feitures did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, but dissented with
208 d. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
209 Id. at 2151 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210 Id. at 2150 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
211 Id. at 2151 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
212 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 2152 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
214 Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Thomas.
215 Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2152 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
216 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
217 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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regard to the proceeding against Ursery.218 In Justice Stevens' opin-
ion, because numerous federal statutes authorize forfeiture in a wide
variety of situations, it is wrong to assume that only one answer exists
to the question of whether civil forfeitures constitute "punishment"
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 19 According to Justice
Stevens, for purposes of double jeopardy analysis in forfeiture cases, it
is useful to categorize property subject to seizure as either proceeds,
contraband, or property that has played a part in the commission of a
crime. 220 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the forfeiture
of proceeds in Arlt and Wren's case did not violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. 221 Since Arlt and Wren's currency derived from illegal
activity, they had no right to retain it, and forfeiture of the currency
cannot constitute punishment 222 In addition, one does not have the
right to possess contraband; insofar as the majority's opinion explains
why forfeiture of contraband does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, therefore, Justice Stevens also agreed with the majority.
223
With regard to the forfeiture of Ursery's home, however, Justice Ste-
vens disagreed with the Court's holding.224 In Justice Stevens' view,
none of the reasons supporting the forfeiture of proceeds or contra-
band provided a sufficient basis for concluding that forfeiture of the
Ursery home was not punitive.
225
Justice Stevens claimed that the majority's decision demonstrated
a stunning disregard for precedent 226 While the majority asserted the
primacy of Various Items and its categorical rule that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause is inapplicable to civil forfeiture actions, Justice Stevens
stated that the case had disappeared from Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, and that the two cases supposedly affirming Various Items-Em-
erald Cut Stones and 89 Firearms-do not even mention it.227 More
importantly, according to Justice Stevens, neither of those cases en-
dorsed the absolute rule of Various Items, instead insisting on a careful
consideration of the nature of a particular forfeiture at issue, classify-
ing it as either punitive or remedial, before deciding whether it impli-
cated double jeopardy.228 Both cases rejected the view that courts
218 Id. at 2152-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
219 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
220 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
221 Id at 2152 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
222 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
223 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
224 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
225 Id. at 2153 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
226 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
227 Id. at 2154 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
228 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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should treat all in rem civil forfeitures the same, and recognized the
possibility that some forfeitures might constitute punishment for a
criminal act if they cannot properly be characterized as remedial.229
According to Justice Stevens, the Court has a long history of ap-
plying other constitutional protections to forfeitures with a punitive
element. 230 By confining its holdings to remedial civil forfeitures, Em-
erald Cut Stones and 89 Firearms recognized that the Double Jeopardy
Clause might apply to certain punitive civil forfeitures. 23' Read prop-
erly, then, the two cases set the stage for the modern understanding of
how the Double Jeopardy Clause applies in a nominally civil proceed-
ing, an understanding developed in Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch.232 Injustice Stevens' opinion, the majority misread these cases
by treating them as if they concerned unrelated subjects, when all sim-
ply defined the concept of "punishment," whether for the Excessive
Fines Clause or the Double Jeopardy Clause.233
Halper established a general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause
applies to any type of civil sanction that does not solely serve remedial
purposes.234 In dealing with civil penalties, Justice Stevens noted that,
in addition to the above-stated general rule, Halper established the
more narrow rule that a fixed penalty, which otherwise would serve
remedial goals, could still punish a defendant if the amount of the
penalty was disproportionate to the damage done.23 5 For a sanction
that is not punitive in character, then, an accounting of the Govern-
ment's damages and costs is necessary to determine whether it never-
theless is punitive in application. 236 Thus, while the fine imposed on
Halper was not by nature punitive, as applied to him, it amounted to
229 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
230 Id. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), for example, a case
in which the Court applied the Fourth Amendment to a proceeding to forfeit an automo-
bile used to transport illegally manufactured liquors, the Court unanimously stated that a
forfeiture is quasi-criminal in character. And in United States v. United States Coin & Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971), the Court applied the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause to a forfeiture proceeding under a statute thatJustice Stevens described as "similar"
to 21 U.S.C. § 881, and concluded that the form of the proceeding as either civil or crimi-
nal made no difference since the sanction was a penalty.
231 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
232 Id. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
233 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
234 Id. at 2156 (StevensJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
235 Id. at 2156-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
236 Id at 2157 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
740 [Vol. 87
DOUBLE JEOPARDY/C VIL FORFEITURE
punishment3 7
While Austin concerned civil forfeitures in the context of the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Stevens stated
that the Court applied Halper's general rule and held that since forfeit-
ures of property under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) can vary so
dramatically, any relationship to the Government's actual costs is
merely coincidental.23 8 Mere compensation to the Government for its
costs cannot justify the statutory scheme.23 9 As such, sanctions under
these statutes cannot be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, and
therefore must be considered punishment under the Halper test.2 40
According to Justice Stevens, the majority missed the point of Halper's
two rules by stating that they find it difficult to see how Halper's case-
by-case approach applied to Austin.2 41 Since the Austin Court deter-
mined that § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) are punitive by design under the
general rule, there was no need to also determine whether it had a
punitive effect in application pursuant to the more narrow rule.
2 42
Thus, there was no need to resort to the "rare case" where an account-
ing of the Government's damages is necessary.2 43
Finally, in Kurth Ranch, the Court applied Halperto a third type of
civil sanction, taxes.2 44 According to Justice Stevens, in applying
Halper's categorical approach to a tax imposed on a defendant con-
victed of owning marijuana, the Court rejected each of the asserted
remedial interests offered for the tax, reasoning therefore that the tax
had a punitive character that rendered it punishment.245 Kurth Ranch
thus followed the approach of Austin.2 46 Given Austin and Kurth
Ranch, injustice Stevens' view, the majority's claim that it is impossible
to apply Halper's approach to forfeitures or taxes missed the point.
247
To decide if a given forfeiture or tax is punitive, the Court need only
examine each claimed remedial interest to determine whether the
sanction actually promotes it.248 In addition, nothing prevents a
court, even in the context of forfeitures, from deciding that although
a sanction is designed to be remedial, as applied it is so extreme as to
237 Id- at 2156 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
238 Id at 2156-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
239 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
240 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
241 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
242 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
243 I& (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
244 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
245 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
246 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
247 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
248 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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constitute punishment on a case-by-case basis. 249
Justice Stevens noted that the Court unanimously decided in Aus-
tin that § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) were punitive in nature, and thus, the
majority now stood Austin on its head by concluding that § 881 (a) (7)
was remedial in character.250 Justice Stevens claimed that Austin pre-
empted the Court's reasons for its conclusion. 251 First, the Court
stated that the forfeiture of Ursery's home was remedial since it was an
instrumentality of a drug crime, but Austin rejected the argument that
a mobile home and body shop were "instruments" of drug trafficking
simply because marijuana was sold out of them.2 52 Second, the Court
claimed that § 881 (a) (7)'s deterrent utility shows its remedial charac-
ter, but Halper expressly held, and Austin and Kurth Ranch confirmed,
that a sanction that can only be explained as also serving either a re-
tributive or deterrent purpose is punishment.2 53 Third, the Court de-
clared the fact that Congress tied § 881 (a) (7) to criminal activity to be
insufficient to render it punitive, but Austin expressly relied upon that
tie as evidence of its punitive nature. 254 Finally, the Court asserted
that § 881 (a) (7) has no scienter requirement, whereas Austin ex-
pressly found that the "innocent owner" provision of the statute,
which forced the Government to prove that any claimant to forfeited
property was culpable, also lent to the punitive view of the statute.25
According to Justice Stevens, the majority continually relied on
the idea that only in personam proceedings can give rise to double
jeopardy concerns, but that the idea that a proceeding's label of in
rem or in personam is dispositive runs directly contrary to Halper, Aus-
tin, and Kurth Ranch.256 In Justice Stevens' opinion, the distinction
between in rem and in personam actions allowed the Court to argue
that the owner of forfeited property is not being punished, just the
property, making the double jeopardy question an easy one.25 7 This
"sleight-of-hand," however, was specifically rejected in Austin.25 8
In Justice Stevens' view, even if the outcome of this case had not
been settled by prior decisions, common sense dictated that there was
249 Id. at 2158 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
250 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
251 Id (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
252 Id at 2158-59 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
253 Id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
254 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
255 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
256 Id at 2159-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
257 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
258 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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no rational basis for characterizing the seizure of Ursery's home as
anything other than punishment for his crime.2 59 The forfeiture sim-
ply had no correlation to any damages suffered by society or to the
cost of enforcing the law.
2 60
V. ANALYSIS 26 1
In light of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, the result in Ursery was
more than a little surprising. One need look no further than the fact
that the Court reversed both the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal, which relied on the three previous Court rulings, for evidence
of the unpredictability of the Court's decision. After declaring that a
fixed civil penalty could violate the DoubleJeopardy Clause in Halper,
that a civil forfeiture statute could be punishment for purposes of the
Excessive Fines Clause in Austin, and that a tax proceeding could vio-
late the Double Jeopardy Clause in Kurth Ranch, the Court appeared
poised to find civil forfeitures also constrained by the double jeopardy
prohibition. While the majority correctly stated that none of those
cases directly addressed the double jeopardy implications of an in rem
civil forfeiture,2 62 the logical extension of its own precedents should
have led the Court to declare particular civil forfeitures "punishment"
259 Id. at 2161 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
260 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In con-
cluding his opinion, Justice Stevens briefly addressed three other arguments, not ad-
dressed by the majority, but advanced by the Government to support its position that
§ 881 (a) (7) does not constitute doublejeopardy. He first rejected the contention that the
word "jeopardy" only refers to criminal proceedings, and that since the civil forfeiture pre-
ceded the criminal conviction, the criminal case was only the first "jeopardy." According to
Justice Stevens, Halper and Kurth Ranch both rested on the assumption that the civil pro-
ceedings in which the second punishment was imposed was a "jeopardy" within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment. I&. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgemenf in part and
dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens next rejected the argument that the civil forfeiture and criminal pro-
ceeding in Ursey did not involve the same offense by noting that the elements the Govern-
ment was required to prove to sustain a forfeiture of Ursery's home under § 881(a) (7)
included each of the elements of his criminal conviction. Thus, the criminal charge was a
lesser-included offense of the forfeiture, and the two proceedings did involve the same
offense under the test of Blockburgerv. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Ursey, 116 S. Ct.
at 2161-62 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part).
Finally, Justice Stevens simply dispensed with the Government's argument that the
forfeiture and criminal conviction should be treated as the same proceeding, since both
were commenced before either reached a final judgment, by stating that it is simply inaccu-
rate to describe two separate proceedings as one. According to Justice Stevens, there is no
procedural obstacle to including a punitive forfeiture in the final judgment of a criminal
case.
261 This analysis concerns only the case of Ursery from the Sixth Circuit. As all nine
Justices agreed, the situation of Arlt and Wren from the Ninth Circuit was clearly not a case
of a Double Jeopardy violation.
262 Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
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for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Ursery decision,
however, finds the Court unwilling to so declare. Instead, the Court
stated the opposite-that civil forfeitures generally are not "punish-
ment" for double jeopardy purposes-and then fell back on the pre-
Halper mode of analysis of 89 Firearms. The refusal of the Court to
extend the logic of its more recent trilogy of cases, and its reliance on
the inadequate test of 89 Firearms, was wrong, and leaves individuals
without an important constitutional protection against the
Government.
A. WHAT IS PUNISHMENT?
Notwithstanding the view of Justices Scalia and Thomas that the
Double Jeopardy Clause only prohibits multiple prosecutions, not
multiple punishments, 263 the Court's jurisprudence clearly establishes
that the Government can only punish an individual once for an of-
fense.2 64 With a criminal conviction already secured against Ursery,
the Court addressed the question of whether the forfeiture of Ursery's
property was "punishment."265 As Justice Stevens observed, determi-
nation of when a particular civil sanction is punishment was the
Court's explicit pursuit in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch 2 66
While the majority correctly noted that neither Halper nor Kurth
Ranch dealt directly with the double jeopardy implications of an in
rem civil forfeiture, those cases represented a shift in the Court's con-
stitutional analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Halper, the
Court declared for the first time that a fixed civil penalty, under cer-
tain circumstances, could be so punitive as to be prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and then established a test for determining
when that prohibition would occur.267 A few years after Halper, the
Kurth Ranch Court further extended the Double Jeopardy Clause's
reach to tax proceedings, finding that they too could be so punitive as
to violate the Clause. 268 At the very least, these two cases signaled a
willingness on the part of the Court to extend the reach of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to certain civil sanctions. According to the majority,
however, the case-by-case test set forth in Halperis impossible to apply
outside the context of a fixed civil-penalty provision, and a tax or civil
penalty simply is not the same type of action as a civil forfeiture. 2
69
263 Id. at 2152.
264 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
265 Ursey, 116 S. Ct. at 2138.
266 Id. at 2156.
267 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
268 Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
269 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2145-46.
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Accepting that the Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions were inapplica-
ble, by themselves, to Ursety because they involved civil sanctions cru-
cially different from civil forfeitures, however, the Court's decision in
Austin further strengthens the impact of these cases.
In Austin, the Court considered the same 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7)
provision that it did in Ursery, and asked the same critical question of
whether civil forfeitures under that statute constituted "punish-
ment."270 As the Austin Court stated, the purpose of the Excessive
Fines Clause is to limit the government's power to punish.271 Relying
on the language and logic of Halper, the Court found that sanctions
often serve more than one purpose, and that if a sanction serves in
part to punish, it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines
Clause.272 Thus, the pursuit for the Austin Court was to determine
whether, at the time of the Eighth Amendment's ratification, forfeit-
ures in general were understood at least in part as punishment, and
whether forfeitures under § 881 (a) were so understood in modem
times.273 After reviewing the Court's history of finding that statutory
in rem forfeitures impose punishment,274 the Court found nothing in
the provisions or legislative history of § 881 (a) to contradict this his-
torical understanding.275 A mere three years before Ursery, then, the
Austin Court categorically deemed forfeitures under § 881 (a) (7)
"punishment" for a given offense. 276
In ruling Austin inapplicable, however, the Ursery majority stated
that "[t]he holding of Austin was limited to the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment, and we decline to import the analysis of
Austin into our double jeopardy jurisprudence."277 In the Court's
view, forfeitures under § 881 (a) (7) after Austin are subject to a test for
excessiveness, but "this does not mean.., that those forfeitures are so
punitive as to constitute punishment for the purposes of doublejeop-
270 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).
271 Id. at 609.
272 d.
273 Id. at 610-11.
274 Id. at 614-15.
275 Id. at 619. In fact, the Court noted that Congress explicitly found, when adding
subsection (a) (7), that traditional criminal sanctions by themselves were inadequate to
deter or punish those engaged in the drug trade. Id. at 620.
276 Id. at 622.
277 United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996). As the majority also stated
earlier in the opinion:
[b]ut Austin, it must be remembered, did not involve the Double Jeopardy Clause at
all. Austin was decided solely under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment, a constitutional provision which we never have understood as parallel to, or




ardy."278 The Court thus explained away Austin based on the ques-
tionable notion that calling § 881 (a) punishment for purposes of the
Excessive Fines Clause is entirely irrelevant for purposes of determin-
ing punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. According to the
Court in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
the designers of the Excessive Fines Clause intended to curb the Gov-
ernment's prosecutorial power-its power to punish.279 In addition,
the Browning-Ferris Court held that the drafters of the Eighth Amend-
ment understood the word "fine" to mean a payment to a sovereign as
punishment for some offense.280 Thus, before a civil sanction imposed
by the Government is subject to the constraints of the Excessive Fines
Clause, it would seem necessary that it first be considered punish-
ment. This would indicate that the standard for excessiveness is
higher than that for punishment, and that any given sanction could
be "punishment" well before that punishment was "excessive." At the
very least, however, the Austin Court unequivocally determined
§ 881(a)'s punitive nature.
This determination is significant when combined with the central
holding of Halper. While the Court declined to mix and match its
analysis, the Court should have remained on the constitutional path
begun in Halper and Kurth Ranch. The majority stated that Halper's
approach is practically difficult to apply to a civil forfeiture, for it is
virtually impossible to quantify the non-punitive purposes served by
civil forfeitures,28 1 but this practical difficulty did not deter the Austin
Court from undertaking that type of analysis and determining that
§ 881 (a) (7) did not serve solely a remedial purpose.2 82 While it is true
that Halper dealt specifically with a fixed civil penalty provision, the
Court clearly stated
that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retribu-
tive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to under-
stand the term.... We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prose-
cution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent
that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial.283
While certainly far from conclusive, given the language used by the
Court, one could make the case that Halper anticipated a scope be-
yond the fixed penalties involved there. Civil forfeitures are a type of
278 Id. at 2147.
279 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
280 Id. at 265.
281 Ursemy, 116 S. Ct. at 2145.
282 Austin v United States, 509 U.S. 602, 619-22 (1993).
283 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (emphasis added).
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civil sanction, and under Austin, § 881 (a) is at least in part punitive.284
A partially punitive purpose is all that a Halper double jeopardy analy-
sis requires.
While the Court technically did not overrule Halper, Austin, and
Kurth Ranch, in artificially confining them to their narrow holdings,
the Court abandoned the approach to punishment it had adopted in
those cases. Logically, the holdings of Halper and Austin extend to
Ursey. Having refused to take the logical next step, however, the
Court stated the broad proposition that civil forfeitures do not consti-
tute punishment for double jeopardy purposes, then reverted to the
test of 89 Firearms. Explaining the apparent inconsistency of stating a
general immunity of civil forfeitures from double jeopardy analysis,
and then subjecting the forfeiture at issue to the test of 89 Firearms,
the Court stated in a footnote that a forfeiture designated as "civil"
actually only establishes a presumption that it is not subject to double
jeopardy.285 Under 89 Firearms, a purportedly civil forfeiture does not
automatically preclude analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
and is not per se exempt from its prohibition. When the "clearest
proof' indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is "so punitive either in
purpose or effect" as to be the equivalent of a criminal proceeding,
then double jeopardy applies.2 86 In other words, according to the
Court, civil forfeitures cannot be "punishment" for double jeopardy
purposes unless they are extremely punitive. With civil forfeitures, as
opposed to other types of civil sanctions, the Court apparently felt that
the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punish-
ments does not apply unless the "punishment" is severe enough.
At its most basic, then, the Court did hold that civil forfeitures
can be "punishment" for Double Jeopardy Clause purposes, but only
when the punishment reaches a degree whereby the forfeiture pro-
ceeding must be "criminal." Thus, the question is not whether civil
forfeitures can be "punishment," but rather how severely punitive the
forfeitures must be before barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The problem with the 89 Firearms test is knowing what is "so punitive"
as to be essentially criminal in character. Notwithstanding the "clear-
est proof' standard, this test is necessarily imprecise, a quality the
Court desired to avoid in not extending the Halper analysis to civil
forfeitures. In essence, the Court's opinion leaves unanswered the
question of what is "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
284 The Austin Court specifically noted that Congress designed § 881(a) (7) to deter and
punish. Austin, 509 U.S. at 620.
285 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148 n.3.




and uncertainty remains under the 89 Firearms test.
To illustrate the inherent problem with the test, even were one to
accept the correctness of analyzing Ursery under 89 Firearms, the Court
arguably still concluded the question incorrectly in light of the
Court's previous conclusions about § 881 (a). In considering the first
prong of 89 Firearms'two-part est, the Court concluded that Congress
intended proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a) (1) (A) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) to be civil.2 87 Under the second prong of the test, however,
taken as a whole, the punitive purpose and effect of § 881 (a) satisfies
the "clearest proof' standard. In Austin, the Court declared § 881 (a)
to be outright punitive.288 In fact, the Court rejected the govern-
ment's contentions that forfeitures under § 881 (a) were remedial
rather than punitive.2 89 In the end, the Austin Court deviated from
the position that the provisions of § 881 (a) are punitive only to assume
that even if the statute serves some remedial goals, it is still punish-
ment under the Halper test.290 Thus, from Austin's analysis of the stat-
ute, § 881 (a) satisfies the second prong of 89 Firearms. The Court
conducted a new analysis, however, and decided that there was "little
evidence" that forfeiture proceedings under the statute meet the "so
punitive either in purpose or effect" standard.29 1 In so holding, the
Court declared that the statutes involved were indistinguishable, in
most respects, from those held not to be punitive in Various Items, Em-
erald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms.292 Nowhere, however, did the Court
acknowledge that Austin already completed a similar analysis on
§ 881 (a) (7).
B. THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST
From the viewpoint of precedent, the Ursery Court should have
followed the pattern established by Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch of
expanding double jeopardy protection to civil sanctions, even were it
not inclined to follow the exact test laid down in Halper. Accepting
that this trilogy of cases is conceptually distinct from Ursery, though, by
falling back on 89 Firearms, the Court mistakenly passed on the oppor-
tunity to improve the test articulated in that case. In particular, a ma-
jor problem with the 89 Firearms test is that it only looks at the statute
287 Id. at 2147.
288 Austin, 509 U.S. at 620.
289 Id. at 620-21. The government argued that the statute is remedial in two respects: 1)
it protects the community from the threat of drug dealing by removing the "instruments"
of the drug trade; and 2) it serves to compensate the government for law enforcement
activities and other social expenditures associated with drug use and trade.
290 Id. at 621-22.




as a whole, not as applied in an individual case. Thus, as a result of
the Court's holding in Ursery, the Double Jeopardy Clause could never
prohibit a forfeiture pursuant to § 881 (a) (7), regardless of what the
Government seeks to forfeit.
Despite the undoubted usefulness of forfeiture proceedings as a
tool of law enforcement,29 3 there exists great possibility for abuse. In
Ursery's case, the Government originally sought forfeiture of his
house on the basis of its use in the processing and distribution of a
controlled substance.2 94 Ultimately, Ursery settled the forfeiture
claim through payment to the Government of $13,250. While Ur-
sery's forfeiture was not unduly severe, under the Court's holding,
nothing forfeited to the Government pursuant to § 881 (a) (7) in any
case would be either, no matter how ridiculously out of line with the
offense actually committed. By approaching a civil forfeiture statute
under the 89 Firearms test, unencumbered by the circumstances of its
application in a particular case, the Court is potentially withholding
an important constitutional protection from individuals in many sym-
pathetic instances. A modified version of the test that takes into ac-
count the aspects of a forfeiture statute as applied in an individual
case would better serve any notions of justice the Double Jeopardy
Clause seeks to protect.
In the final analysis, however, the holding of Ursey does not nec-
essarily spell certain disaster for individual liberties. First and fore-
most is the fact that the Government can utilize civil forfeiture statutes
in conjunction with a criminal prosecution anyway, so long as it brings
the two actions in the same proceeding.295 Moreover, regardless of
the wisdom of the Court's holding, the case did not in fact reverse any
precedent, and the majority correctly stated that, historically, the
Double Jeopardy Clause has never prohibited civil forfeitures.
2 96
In addition, while the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is a key aspect of the individual liberty guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, civil forfeitures deal directly with individual's rights in
property, and property rights are arguably less crucial than other
rights specified. The text of the Fifth Amendment itself allows the
argument that the Framers did not intend to cover civil forfeitures
when enacting the DoubleJeopardy Clause, for there is no mention of
property rights in the clause as there is in other basic rights provisions.
293 See STvEN L. KFSSLER, CiML AND CPiNnAL Fox=rUE, § 3.01[2][h] (1995). For
example, by using civil forfeitures, law enforcement authorities benefit from a lesser bur-
den of proof.
294 Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2139.
295 Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
296 Urseiy, 116 S. Ct. at 2140.
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For example, the Due Process Clause of the same Fifth Amendment
specifically states that no one shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'2 97 In contrast, the Framers of
the Bill of Rights only mention "life or limb" in the Double Jeopardy
Clause in stating what the Government cannot twice put in jeop-
ardy.2 98 Thus, the text of the clause itself might help explain the
traditional reluctance of the Court to subject civil forfeitures to
double jeopardy analysis.
Finally, as Justice Scalia stated in Kurth Ranch, other Bill of Rights
provisions protect against civil forfeitures that are arguably punish-
ment.299 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment restricts the nature of a punishment, and the Excessive
Fines Clause of the same amendment controls the cumulative extent
of punishment.300 In addition, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment serves to guarantee that a civil forfeiture is authorized by
the legislature.301
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Ursery had the opportunity to fashion a new test that
extends double jeopardy protection to in rem civil forfeitures. While
the Court recently applied such protection to other civil sanctions
such as monetary penalties and taxes, it surprisingly and mistakenly
chose not to follow the logic of its precedents. At the very least, if not
specifically inclined to follow the analysis of Halper and Kurth Ranch,
the Court should have developed some sort of test that considers the
applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures as ap-
plied on an individual basis. Instead, in reaffirming the test of 89Fire-
arms that only looks at a civil forfeiture statute as a whole, for all
practical purposes, double jeopardy protection remains unavailable to
persons subjected to civil forfeitures sought by the Government. Civil
forfeitures are an important law enforcement weapon utilized in the
war on drugs, and the particular use of that weapon against Ursery was
certainly far from unduly severe. The Court's holding, however, was
unnecessarily broad and potentially exposes future individuals to un-
just punishments that fall outside the protective terms of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
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297 U.S. Const. amend V.
298 Id.
299 Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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